# The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure

# is not suitable for individual use

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Vahey et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis concluded that the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure has potential “as a tool for clinical assessment”. Here I present evidence to the contrary. Using a large open dataset, 95% Confidence Intervals were calculated for each participant’s *D* scores via bootstrapping. Results demonstrate that Confidence Intervals are extremely wide; only a small fraction of individuals were shown to have non-zero IRAP effects; only a small fraction of individuals’ *D* scores were discriminable from other individuals’ *D* scores; and individuals’ confidence intervals spanned roughly half the total observed range. Using an alternative scoring algorithm, the Probabilistic Index (PI), did not consistently improve these metrics. Lastly, the IRAP was also shown to be substantially inferior to the most popular implicit measure, the Implicit Association Test, on each of these metrics. In its currently form, the IRAP is therefore unsuitable for individual level use or assessment in both research and applied contexts. All data and code available at [osf.io/mb4ph](https://osf.io/mb4ph)

The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) is a reaction-time based task that has seen both significant use as a measure of implicit attitudes and, to a lesser extent, within Relational Frame Theory research as a measure of relational responding (Barnes-Holmes & Harte, 2022; Hussey, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2015). There is enduring interest in using the IRAP at the individual level. For example, one of the earliest published articles using the IRAP was explicit that the developers of the task had ambitions that it could be used at the individual level (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2008, p. 512). Subsequently, in their meta-analysis of clinically relevant IRAP studies, Vahey et al. (2015) concluded that the IRAP has potential “as a tool for clinical assessment” (p. 64). In addition, a recent study reported individual level analyses of IRAP data (Finn et al., 2019), suggesting interest in the individual level utility of the task in both research and applied settings.

However, for the IRAP to have individual-level utility, whether that be for clinical assessment, research use or otherwise, scores produced on the task by a single individual would need to be precisely estimated. Unfortunately, there is good *a priori* reason to believe that the IRAP effects – typically quantified using the *D* scoring algorithm (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010; Greenwald et al., 2003) – are likely to be imprecisely estimated at the individual level. In a typical IRAP, *D* scores are calculated from only 18 pairs of reaction times. This small number of trials is also in contrast to the use of reaction-time based tasks elsewhere in psychology. For example, the Implicit Association Test calculates scores from 120 reaction times (Greenwald et al., 1998), and the Stroop effect is frequently calculated from several hundred reaction times (Liefooghe et al., 2019). Given the high degree of variability and skew associated with reaction time data (Ratcliff, 1993; Whelan, 2008), this means that any given individual’s IRAP effect is likely to be imprecisely estimated.

Surprisingly, no research to date has quantified how well IRAP effects are estimated at the individual level. This study therefore calculated confidence intervals around individual participants’ IRAP effects. This was done using a large open dataset containing IRAPs measuring many different attitude domains. These intervals were then used to estimate (1) the typical width of confidence intervals around IRAP *D* scores, (2) the proportion of *D* scores that can be inferred to differ from zero (i.e., where evidence of an IRAP effect was obtained), (3) the proportion of *D* scores that could be said to differ from one another (i.e., agnostic to the zero point), and (4) the proportion of the observed range of all *D* scores that was covered by an individual participant’s *D* score. Following a recent call to consider alternative scoring algorithms for IRAP data, the performance of the *D* score was then compared with the a more robust method: the Probabilistic Index (PI: De Schryver et al., 2018).

Finally, recent debate in the broader implicit measures literature has suggested that these measures are particularly noisy and are reliant on group-level aggregation to produce reliable and replicable effects (Connor & Evers, 2020). It is therefore worth considering whether the IRAP’s individual level performance is particular to it, or representative of other implicit measures. That is, what is the IRAP’s individual level performance relative to a closely related task? In order to assess this question, the IRAP’s utility for individual assessment was compared to the most common popular implicit measure, the Implicit Association Test (IAT: Greenwald et al., 1998), again using a large open IAT dataset of assessing many different attitude domains.

# Method

## Data

**IRAP data.** Data were taken from a large open dataset of all IRAP research. This dataset was constructed by contacting individuals at multiple labs conducing IRAP research and asking them to contribute their well-organized trial level IRAP data, as well as all stimuli and task parameters to generate that data, to an openly available dataset. The resulting dataset contained all data from two labs (Hussey & Drake, 2020a; dataset available for reuse at osf.io/v3twe). Inclusion criteria used for the curation of that dataset were listed by Hussey and Drake (2020) to be as follows: (1) study used at least one IRAP task, excluding variants such as MT-IRAP (Levin et al., 2010), NL-IRAP (Kavanagh et al., 2016), or training-IRAP (Murphy et al., 2019); if a given study employed more than one IRAP, only data from the first IRAP each participant completed was used; and (3) trial-level reaction time data was available. The dataset contains both published and (previously) unpublished data (for prior publications see Drake et al., 2016, 2018; Finn et al., 2016; Hussey, Daly, et al., 2015). Data was included from both published and unpublished papers following Cochrane guidelines (Higgins & Thomas, 2022: section 4.3.2). Data came from 18 different substantive domains: body shape, Clinton-Trump, Christianity-Islam, suffering and development between countries, disgust, gender stereotypes, ideographic evaluations of friends and enemies, life and death, personality, race, religion, rich-poor, sexuality and arousal, shapes and colors, stigma, and valanced words. Some domains involved more than one stimulus set within the IRAP, for example there were two variants of the race IRAP.

**IAT data.** Data was taken the Attitudes, Identity and Individual Differences (AIID) dataset: a large, multivariate, planned missing data study on implicit and explicit attitudes within many different domains designed for reuse. See the AIID dataset documentation for the design of the study, all data, code, and materials (Hussey et al., 2019). The AIID dataset was suitable for the current research question because, like the IRAP dataset, it included data from a large number of different attitude domains (95 in total, including race, religion, social groups, celebrities, politicians, political parties, and brand preferences). Inclusion criteria were self-reported fluent English, complete trial-level IAT data, and use of an evaluative IAT. Exclusion criteria were performance-based accuracy and latency exclusions often employed in IAT studies (specifically those used in Nosek et al., 2007). These exclusion criteria are relatively strict, and recent research has suggested they may be conservative (Greenwald et al., 2022). However, the full AIID dataset is over 230,000 participants. This represented an overabundance of data for the current research question, especially given that bootstrapping confidence intervals on individual participants’ *D* scores is relatively computationally intensive. Therefore a subset of 100 participants per attitude domain after exclusions was randomly sampled from the full public dataset, to make 9500 participants total. This allowed us to employ the previously mentioned conservative exclusion criteria in order to ensure high data quality. Code to reproduce this random sampling is available in the supplementary materials.

## Participants

The IRAP dataset included 1571 participants prior to exclusions. Individual participants were excluded on the basis of outlier reaction times (i.e., deviation of ± 2 median absolute deviations). 109 participants were excluded on this basis, leaving 1462 in the analytic sample. This sample size was therefore roughly three times larger than the total sample size studied in Vahey et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis of clinically relevant IRAP research (*N* = 494), and was roughly 40 time larger than the median published IRAP study. Where demographic data was available, the sample was 62.4% women, 37.3% male, and 0.2% identified using another label; *M*age = 20.1, *SD* = 4.3. Sample sizes for each domain ranged from *N* = 11 to 137, *M* = 44.9, *SD* = 30.1. The included IAT dataset included 9500 participants after exclusions and random sampling of 100 participants in each of the 95 domains. Where demographic data was available, the sample was 66.4% women and 33.6% male; *M*age = 31.6, *SD* = 12.5. All participants in both datasets provided informed consent and individual studies were approved by the local institutional review board.

## Measures

**Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure.** The IRAP is a computer-based reaction time task. Its procedural parameters have been discussed in great detail in many other papers (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010; Hussey, Thompson, et al., 2015), and so only a brief overview of the general procedure will be provided here. On each block of trials, participants are presented with images or words at the top of the screen and in the middle of the screen. Response options are presented on the bottom-left and bottom-right hand sides of the screen, and are mapped to the left and right response keys. In order to progress to the next trial, the correct response must be given. Incorrect responses result in a red X being presented on screen. Between blocks of trials, this correct response changes so that, for example, participants must respond to “white people” and “dangerous” with “True” on one block and “False” on the other block. Participants complete pairs of these blocks in two phases: practice and testing. In order to progress from practice to testing, the participant must respond quickly and accurately on both blocks within the pair (typically with median reaction time < 2000 ms and percentage accuracy > 80%). Should they fail to meet these criteria, the participant completes another pair of practice blocks. Should they meet the criteria, they progress to the testing phase only where they complete three pairs of blocks in a row. Only reaction time data from the test blocks is used in the analyses (Hussey, Thompson, et al., 2015). Differential reaction times between the two block types are used to quantify the IRAP effect. Typically, but not exclusively, one score is calculated for each of the four trial types on the task. These are formed by the relating of two classes of sample stimuli (e.g., Black people vs. White people) and two classes of target stimuli (e.g., positive vs. negative) to make four trial types (e.g., Black people – positive, Black people – negative, White people – positive and White people – negative).

**Implicit Association Test.** Likewise, the IAT had been described in great detail elsewhere (Greenwald et al., 1998; Nosek et al., 2005), and so only a brief overview will be provided here. On each block of trials, participants are presented with images or words in the middle of the screen from four different categories (e.g., images of white face, images of black faces, positive words, and negative words). Two pairs of category labels for these stimuli are presented on the top left and top right-hand sides of the screen (e.g., White people, Black people, Positive, and Negative) and are mapped to the left and right response keys so that each key shares both a target and a attribute category. Participants must categorize the stimuli in the middle of the screen using the two response options which are mapped to the four categories. In order to progress to the next trial, the correct response must typically be given. Incorrect responses result in a red X being presented on screen. Between blocks of trials, the mapping of the category labels and the required response changes so that, for example, on one block type participants White people and positive words share the left response key and Black people and negative words share the right response key. On the other block type the opposite is the case, for example White people and negative words share the left response key and Black people and positive words share the right response key. Participants are instructed to sort the stimuli as quickly and accurately as possible. Differential reaction times between the two block types are used to quantify the IAT effect. In contrast to the IRAP, IAT scores are almost exclusively quantified as a single score representing an overall bias (e.g., towards responding faster to “Black people – positive / White people – negative” relative to “Black people – negative / White people – positive”).

## Scoring methods

IRAP and IAT studies typically use the *D* scoring method to convert each participant’s reaction times into analyzable scores for each individual. The *D* score has some similarities to Cohen’s *d*, insofar as it is a trimmed and standardized difference in mean reaction time between the two block types. The specifics of the *D* score have been discussed in precise detail in other publications (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010; Greenwald et al., 2003; Hussey, Thompson, et al., 2015), and therefore will only be summarized here. Its key points are that reaction times > 10,000 ms are trimmed, a mean reaction time is calculated for the trials in each block type, and a standard deviation is calculated for the pooled trials in both block types. The difference between the means is then divided by the standard deviation, resulting in a *D* score. *D* scores have a maximum possible range of -2 to +2, with 0 representing the neutral point. In the IRAP literature, this zero point is often employed as a meaningful reference point from which comparisons are made, such differences from zero *t*-tests (Hussey, Daly, et al., 2015) or testing the proportion of scores that are above vs. below zero (Finn et al., 2019).

De Schryver et al. (2018) discussed some of the limitations of the *D* score, whose assumptions are typically violated by IRAP and IAT data, and argued that more robust scoring and interpretable scoring methods should be employed, specifically the Probabilistic Index (PI). This effect size has also been employed under several other names including the probability of superiority or Ruscio’s A (Ruscio, 2008). The PI can be interpreted as “the probability that a randomly selected inconsistent trial has a larger RT than a randomly selected consistent trial” (De Schryver et al., 2018, p.100). As a probability, PI scores have a maximum possible range of 0 to 1, with 0.50 representing the neutral point of no IRAP/IAT effect. PI scores can also be implemented using exactly this definition, as an exhaustive comparison of ordinal rank between block types. Computationally efficient R code to do this was supplied in Ruscio’s (2008) supplementary materials, which was used to calculate PI scores in addition to the more commonly used *D* scores.

Note that the IRAP literature has historically described the neutral point of equal speed of responding between the two block types as the “zero point”, on the basis that the neutral point equals the zero point when using the *D* score. For the sake of compatibility with the existing IRAP literature, I employ the term “zero point” for both *D* = 0 and PI = 0.50 (i.e., “zero point” refers to the point of zero bias rather than a score of zero).

## Bootstrapped 95% Confidence Intervals

Participants are typically described as demonstrating a positive effect if its value is descriptively above the zero point (i.e., *D* = 0, PI = 0.50), and a negative effectif it is descriptively below it. This can be a useful description of how to interpret the direction of an effect description of an effect (Hussey, Thompson, et al., 2015). However, when dealing with data from individual participants, this practice moves from mere description or interpretation to necessitating an inference method. That is, if we wish to state that a given participant demonstrated a positive IRAP effect on a given trial type, it is not sufficient that their score merely be descriptively greater than the neutral point (e.g., *D* > 0), rather it must be possible to show their score is greater than the neutral point via an inference test (e.g., the lower bound confidence interval of the *D* score > 0). Depending on the width of the confidence intervals, it may be the case that even descriptively large *D* scores do not allow us to infer a deflection from zero. In order to quantify the uncertainty around individual *D* scores and allow us to make inferences about individuals, I therefore calculated confidence intervals around individual scores (i.e., one *D* score for each of the four IRAP trial types for each participant; a single *D* score for the IAT following standard practice). To the best of my knowledge, no published study using the IRAP or IAT has calculated or reported confidence intervals on individuals’ scores before now. In order to provide a comparison for the performance of the *D* score and following De Schryver et al.’s (2018) recommendations, PI scores and their 95% confidence intervals were also calculated.

One method for estimating confidence intervals around individual’s scores on a measure is via the Standard Error of Measurement. Dudek (1979) specified the formula for this as

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where SD refers to the standard deviation of scores on the measure and refers to the measure’s reliability. Confidence intervals can then be estimated via the usual method: , where for 95% intervals 1.96. This method (a) assumes that the scale’s range is unbounded and (b) produces one value for the SEM, and therefore one confidence interval width, for all participants in the sample. This makes it less suitable for the current study, as both *D* and PI scores have bounded ranges (*D* = [–2, +2]; PI = [0, 1]). Because of this, confidence intervals based on the SEM will sometimes lie outside the bounds of possible *D* and PI scores and therefore be nonsensical. In addition to this, *D* scoring involves trimming reaction times > 10000 ms. This effectively varies the length for some participants. Given that reliability estimates are a function of task length, this then violates the SEM’s assumption of a single reliability estimate used for all participants. Together, these issues make the SEM a less suitable method for estimating confidence intervals around individuals’ IRAP and IAT scores.[[1]](#footnote-1)

A more appropriate approach to estimating for estimating confidence intervals around individual’s scores on a measure is, generically speaking, related to the Standard Error of the Mean. However, this requires the variance of the effect size metric to be mathematically defined. To the best of my knowledge, the variance of the *D* score effect size has not been defined. This is possibly due to its somewhat odd properties such as bounded range and the correlation between its numerator and denominator, which is in stark contrast with other forms of standardized mean difference effect sizes on which it was nominally based (see De Schryver et al., 2018; Greenwald et al., 2003).

A viable alternative method for calculating confidence intervals that are still related to the Standard Error of the Mean is bootstrapping. Briefly, bootstrapping, or random sampling with replacement, is a resampling method that is often used as an alternative to mathematical statistical inference in cases where parametric assumptions might be violated or parameters are not trivial to calculate, such as with the *D* score. In this case, bootstrapping involved calculating scores using random samples from the data for each participant, with replacement, a large number of times. The resulting distribution of bootstrapped scores was then parameterized to obtain confidence intervals. For a book length introduction to bootstrapping see for example the classical text by Mooney et al. (1993). This was accomplished for both *D* and PI scores via bootstrapping using the R package boot (Canty, 2002) using 5000 resamples. The Bias Corrected and Accelerated (BCa) method was used to minimize bias relative to other bootstrapping methods (see Albright, 2019 for discussion and simulation study). Confidence intervals were bootstrapped, but the point estimate *D* and PI score were computed as normal. All data and R code to reproduce the analyses or reuse for other purposes are available on the Open Science Framework ([osf.io/mb4ph](https://osf.io/mb4ph)).

**Figure 1.** Caterpillar plot of IRAP *D* scores and their bootstrapped 95% Confidence Intervals calculated for each domain and trial type and displayed split by domain



In summary, *D* scores were calculated following standard practice for each participant, at the trial type level for the IRAP (but not the IAT which does not separate trial types), and in each domain (for both IRAP and IAT). For each score, 95% Confidence Intervals were also calculated via bootstrapping. The same data used to calculate *D* scores and their corresponding confidence intervals was then used to also calculate PI scores and their confidence intervals.

# Results

## Utility of individual level IRAP *D* scores

Participants’ IRAP *D* scores and 95% Confidence Intervals are presented in Figure 1. These were clustered by domain, and arranged by ranking the participants by their *D* score. This type of plot is sometimes referred to as a caterpillar plot in the meta-analysis literature (e.g., Fernández-Castilla et al., 2020), and a similar form of plot – albeit without 95% CIs – was used in a recent IRAP publication that analyzed data at the individual level (Finn et al., 2019, figure 3 p.433). Individual estimates and their intervals were colored based on whether the interval excluded the zero point or not (*D* = 0). It was split by domain but not trial type on the basis that a further split by trial type would make each individual plot so small as to be uninterpretable. Note however that while the plot does not separate the trial types within each domain, the estimates and bootstraps were indeed calculated at the trial type level. The

**Figure 2.** Proportion of IRAP *D* and PI scores that exclude the zero point within each domain and trial type



trial type level data is available in the supplementary materials.

**95% Confidence Intervals widths.** The distribution of confidence interval widths demonstrated very strong skew. As such, it was not appropriate to meta-analyze the widths or describe their distribution using means or even medians. Instead, I report the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimate (Makowski et al., 2019), which represents the most probable value in a distribution of continuous values (i.e., is akin to the mode for continuous data). Across all domains and trial types, the most probable value (MAP) for the width of an individual’s *D* score’s 95% Confidence Interval was *D* = 1.31 (i.e., D score ±0.66). Within domains and trial types, the smallest most probable value (MAP) was *D* = 0.75 and the largest was *D* = 1.35.

Figure 1S in the supplementary materials illustrates the MAP 95% Confidence Interval widths by domain and trial type, and suggests that widths are fairly consistent, but with exceptions. However, these exceptions cannot be diagnosed as a pattern between trial types or the domains being assessed (e.g., both high and low MAP 95% CI widths for different race IRAPs and shapes-colors IRAPs). Luckily, the assessment of the utility of the IRAP data at the individual level does not rely on quantifying the width of confidence intervals directly, but instead on three properties of these intervals. The following sections discuss these each in turn.

**Proportion of non-zero scores.** The color of the point estimates and intervals in Figure 1 were determined by whether the interval excludes the zero point. That is, they are colored by whether an IRAP effect was detectable or not. Analyses assessing deviation from the zero point have been used throughout the IRAP literature to date (e.g., from the first publication to the most recent ones: Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006; Kavanagh et al., 2022). On this basis, if the IRAP has utility at the individual level, a large proportion of participants’ scores on the IRAP should also be detectably different from the zero point (i.e., there

**Figure 3.** Proportion of IRAP *D* and PI scores that can be discriminated from one another within each domain and trial type



**Figure 4.** Proportion of the observed range covered by individual participants’ IRAP *D* scores’ bootstrapped 95% Confidence Intervals within each domain and trial type.



scores is interpreted in this section; the comparison between *D* and PI scores within this model is returned to later on. Full results of this and all models can be found in the supplementary materials. This and all subsequent models return point estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (CI), and also a 95% Prediction Interval (PI; using the nomenclature for this interval employed by the metafor R package: Viechtbauer, 2010). Whereas confidence intervals represent a long run probability of the true (i.e., data generating) value, prediction intervals instead represent the long run probability of the point estimates that are likely to be observed given the observed heterogeneity in the random effect, and are used in meta-analyses in order to quantify the impact of heterogeneity on results. They are sometimes referred to as Credibility Intervals, but this term can be confused with the Bayesian analogue to Confidence Intervals so I avoid it here. These have utility within the current analyses given that there is heterogeneity in the proportion of participants that demonstrate non-zero IRAP effects between trial types and domains (see Figure 2). Prediction intervals allow us to quantify this variation among the observed data – even allow for generalizations to as-yet unobserved new conditions (e.g., new domains or stimulus sets).

**Proportion of scores that differ from one another.** The previous analysis treats the zero point as a meaningful reference point, on the basis that this is a common practice throughout the IRAP literature. However, some authors have argued that the zero point is not actually a neutral reference point for IRAP scores. This has been described various as a positivity bias (O’Shea et al., 2016), the Single Trial Type Dominance Effect (Finn et al., 2017), or the generic pattern among IRAP effects (Hussey & Drake, 2020b). Regardless of what label is used, there appears to be consensus that deviation from the zero point is often not exclusively due to the relation among the sample and target stimuli within the task. A necessary implication of this is that the zero point (*D* = 0) cannot be inferred to represent no bias (agnostic to whatever that bias may represent for a given community of researchers, e.g., implicit attitudes vs. the impact of a history of relational responding). As such, in addition to the previous analysis that estimated the proportion of *D* scores that are different from the zero point, it is useful to also estimate the proportion of *D* scores that can be shown to differ from one another, which is agnostic to any one specific point. That is, rather than comparing a given individual’s *D* score’s 95% Confidence Interval against zero, we can compare it against all other participants’ *D* scores (within the same trial type and domain). We can refer to this as an assessment of the discriminability of an individual’s *D* score from other participants scores. If the IRAP has utility at the individual level, participants scores on the IRAP should be discriminable from other participants scores (i.e., there should be detectable variation between participants).

The difference between two estimates is often assessed through the non-overlap of their confidence intervals. However, this can be shown to be an overly conservative approach on the basis that significant differences can exist when there is a slight overlap in intervals. As such, the more appropriate and liberal test is to assess the confidence interval on the difference score between the two estimates. This point was made particularly clearly in a report by the Cornell Statistical Consulting Unit (2008), whose formula (p.2) was used to assess pairwise differences between scores: the null hypothesis was rejected when

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The proportion of scores that that could be discriminated from other scores (i.e., the proportion of significant differences) was then calculated and its 95% Confidence Intervals estimated via bootstrapping. In order to only compare like with like, these were calculated within domain and trial type. Figure 3 illustrates the proportion of other *D* and PI scores that a given individual’s score can be discriminated from for each trial type and domain. The plot suggests significant heterogeneity may be present between the trial types and domains.

The estimates were then subjected to a similar analysis as the previous one, with identical transformations, weightings, and both fixed and random effect specifications. Only the dependent variable was changed to the proportion of discriminable scores. Results of model 2 demonstrated that, across domains and trial types, the meta-analytic proportion of *D* scores that were found to be discriminable from one another was =0.08, 95% CI [0.06, 0.11], 95% PI [0.02, 0.35] (see Figure 5, middle panel, *D* scores). To again put the prediction interval in simple terms: across a wide variety of domains, some assessed via multiple different stimulus sets, and even between different trial types, only 2–35% of individuals’ *D* scores were found to be discriminable from the other individuals’ *D* scores within the same domain and trial type, typically 8%. As there was little detectable variation between individuals’ *D* scores, this is an additional line of evidence that suggests the IRAP does not have utility at the individual level.

**Proportion of observed range covered by individual scores.** It is also useful and important to understand an individual *D* score’s confidence interval width in the context of the maximum range of scores. Loosely speaking, if scores on a given depression scale told us that a given individual lay in the range of 2 to 8, it would be important to know whether the maximum range of the scale is 1 to 100 (in which case the individual could meaningfully be said to be on the lower end of the scale’s continuum) or 1 to 10 (in which case little could be said about where the individual lies on the continuum). If most participants lie within a large portion of all observed scores, and there is assume that there should be genuine variation between individuals, then the scale may have little utility. If the IRAP has utility at the individual level, a given participant’s estimated score on the IRAP should be cover a relatively small proportion of the total observed range of all participants’ intervals (i.e., individuals’ scores should exclude them from large proportions of the observed continuum).

**Figure 5.** Results of meta-analyses 1 to 3 assessing the individual level utility of IRAP *D* scores and comparing them with IRAP PI scores.



Although *D* scores have a maximum theoretical range of -2 to 2, such extreme values are not typically observable. The observed range of *D* score’s 95% Confidence Intervals (i.e., from the lowest lower CI to the highest upper CI) across all participants, domains, and trial types was *D* = -1.51 to 1.71. In order to estimate the proportion of the observed range covered by a given participant’s interval, the width of the interval was divided by the observed range of intervals within each trial type and domain, and its mean and variance were then calculated (see Figure 4). These proportions were then subjected to a similar analysis as the previous two, with identical transformations, and both fixed and random effect specifications. The dependent variable was changed to the proportion of the observed range covered by individual 95% Confidence Intervals (within each trial type and domain). Results of model 3 demonstrated that, across domains and trial types, the meta-analytic proportion of the observed range covered by individual intervals was =0.51, 95% CI [0.50, 0.53], 95% PI [0.42, 0.61] (see Figure 5, lower panel, *D* scores). To again put the prediction interval in simple terms: across a wide variety of domains, some assessed via multiple different stimulus sets, and even between different trial types, individual confidence intervals were found to cover 42–61% of the observed range of *D* score intervals within the same domain and trial type, typically 51%. As individuals’ confidence intervals covered a large proportion of the total observed range of intervals, this line of evidence also suggests the IRAP does not have utility at the individual level.

## Comparing individual level utility of IRAP *D* scores with the IRAP PI score

Each of the three previous meta-analytic models also included the data scored using the PI as well as the *D* score, and assessed differences in proportions between the two. Results are reported below for each. No direct comparison between the MAP of the width of the confidence intervals of the *D* versus PI was possible because they have different maximum possible ranges (i.e., are on different scales).

**Proportion of non-zero scores.** model 1, the meta-analytic proportion of PI scores that were found to differ from the zero point was =0.08, 95% CI [0.05, 0.12], 95% PI [0.01, 0.46] (see Figure 5, upper panel, PI scores). Scoring the IRAP with the PI score instead of the *D* score did not improve this proportion, = 0.00, *p* = .56.

**Proportion of scores that differ from one another.** In model 2, the meta-analytic proportion of PI scores that were found to be discriminable from one another was =0.08, 95% CI [0.06, 0.10], 95% PI [0.01, 0.33] (see Figure 5, middle panel, PI scores). Scoring the IRAP with the PI score instead of the *D* score did not improve this proportion, = 0.00, *p* = .15.

**Proportion of observed range covered by individual scores.** In model 3, the proportion of the observed range of PI scores covered by individuals 95% Confidence Intervals was =0.49, 95% CI [0.47, 0.51], 95% PI [0.40, 0.58] (see Figure 5, lower panel, PI scores). Scoring the IRAP with the PI score instead of the *D* score resulted in an improved, smaller proportion of coverage, although the magnitude of change was very small, = -0.02, *p* < .001.

## Comparing individual level utility of IRAP *D* scores with IAT *D* scores

The individual level performance of the IRAP was then compared with that of the IAT in order to provide a direct comparison with a closely related measure. The main purpose of these analyses is to estimate the direction and magnitude of differences between the IRAP and IAT. These analyses compare *D* scored data on both measures, as the most commonly employed scoring method. Note that, because of necessary changes to the random effect model specifications (see next section for details), the estimation of the IRAP’s performance can differ from models 1 to 3 reported earlier. Where any differences exist, models 1 to 3 represent the more appropriate and authoritative results for the purposes of evaluative the IRAP itself (as they fully model differences between IRAP trial types), whereas models 4 to 6 are useful for comparing the IRAP to the IAT for comparison purposes. Analogous to Figure 1, IAT *D* scores and their confidence intervals for every domain can be found in Figure 2S in the supplementary materials. Analogous to Figure 1S, the MAP IAT *D* score 95% CI widths can be found in Figure 3S in the supplementary materials.

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**Proportion of non-zero scores.** Model 4 was similar to model 1. The proportion with of IAT *D* scores that exclude the zero point by domain can be found in Figure 4S in the supplementary materials. The fixed effect comparison in model 4 was task rather than scoring method (i.e., IRAP *D* score vs. IAT *D* score rather than IRAP *D* score vs. IRAP PI score). Because the IAT has only one trial type, the random intercept only specified domain rather than domain and trial type. Because there was substantial differences in proportions between the tasks, this was allowed to vary in the random structure too by specifying a random slope for task. The meta-analytic proportion of IAT *D* scores that were found to differ from the zero point was =0.57, 95% CI [0.52, 0.62], 95% PI [0.06, 0.97] (see Figure 6, upper panel, IAT *D* scores). This was significantly better than for the IRAP *D* scores and the magnitude of the difference in proportions was large, = 0.51, *p* < .001.

**Proportion of observed range covered by individual scores.** Model 6 was similar to model 3. The proportion with of the observed interval width covered by individual IAT *D* scores 95% Confidence Intervals in each domain can be found in Figure 6S in the supplementary materials. The same modifications to the fixed and random effects were made as model 4. The proportion of the observed range of IAT *D* scores covered by individuals 95% Confidence Intervals was =0.26, 95% CI [0.26, 0.27], 95% PI [0.16, 0.41] (see Figure 6, lower panel, IAT *D* scores). This was significantly better than for the IRAP *D* scores and the magnitude of the difference in proportions was large, = 0.24, *p* < .001.

# Discussion

Early in the IRAP’s development, its creators raised the question of whether it could eventually be used at the individual level (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2008, p. 512). In their meta-analysis of the IRAP’s clinical criterion validity, Vahey et al. (2015) optimistically declared that the IRAP has potential “as a tool for clinical assessment” (p. 64). The current results suggest otherwise; that the IRAP, in its current form, does not currently have individual level utility. Analyses of four different metrics consistently suggested that the IRAP does not have utility at the individual level. A given IRAP *D* score’s confidence intervals are likely to be very wide (i.e., a given participant’s *D* score ±0.66), with the result that, in the great majority of cases, no IRAP effect is detectible at the individual level (92%), and individuals’ *D* scores cannot be differentiated from other participants’ scores in the same domain and trial type (92%). A given individuals’ *D* scores’ 95% Confidence Interval typically spans a very large proportion (51%) of the observed range of all scores within a given domain and trial type, suggesting that little can be said with confidence about where the individual lies on the continuum that is being assessed.

Except for a minority of extreme scores, an individual *D* score is in general so imprecisely estimated as to allow for almost no inferences about the individual, including where on the scale they lie, that they demonstrated an IRAP effect, whether their score is different from other participants’ scores. This point can be illustrated with a simple example: if a participant completed an IRAP and demonstrated a *D* score of 0.30 (i.e., greater than zero and putting them in the 66th percentile of all *D* scores in the dataset), we might traditionally describe this as a positive IRAP effect. If this was on the Black-positive trial type of a race IRAP, this would typically be interpreted as a pro-Black implicit bias. However, when the confidence intervals around *D* scores are considered (e.g., using the most probable confidence interval width: 95% CI [-0.36, 0.96]), we would more accurately say that the participant’s data is (a) no detectable IRAP effect was demonstrated (i.e., 95% Confidence Intervals did not exclude the zero point), and (b) their data is equally compatible with them demonstrating a moderately anti-Black (*D* = -0.36) to strongly pro-Black effect (*D* = 0.96).

Results of a second set of meta-analytic models demonstrated that using an alternative scoring method, the PI, does not consistently or substantially improve the IRAP’s individual level utility. This suggests that rescoring IRAP data does not represent a simple fix for the issue.

Finally, results from a third set of meta-analytic models assessed whether the IRAP is (a) as Connor & Ever (2020) recently argued, like many implicit measures in that it is a noisy measure at the individual level, or (b) whether the IRAP seems to have particularly bad performance relative to its peers. Across all metrics of individual level performance, the IRAP performed significantly and substantially worse than the most popular implicit measure, the Implicit Association Test.

## Implications for behavior analytic research using the IRAP

The IRAP was recently argued to be better suited to investigating behavior analytic questions than questions around implicit attitudes (Barnes-Holmes & Harte, 2022). It is important to note that the analysis of individual level IRAP data can serve neither theoretical purpose if its effects are very imprecisely estimated, regardless of whether you couch this in psychometric (e.g., poor individual level estimation) or behavior analytic language (e.g., poor stimulus control within the task). For example, Finn et al. (2019) adopted an explicitly behavior analytic approach, consistent with the recent recommendations of Barnes-Holmes and Harte’s (2022) call for a behavior analytic program of IRAP research. However, Finn et al.’s (2019) individual level analyses IRAP data are equally as stymied by the IRAP’s imprecise estimation of individual level effects as any explicitly social-cognitive research using the IRAP as a measure of implicit attitudes.

## Possible ways to improve individual level utility

Notionally, the estimation of individual scores could be improved. This could take many forms, including substantially lengthening the procedure. Given that reliability is determined in part by task length, this would also help raise the IRAP’s internal consistency and test-retest reliability, which are currently between poor and unacceptably low (Hussey & Drake, 2020a). Simulation studies would be useful in estimating the relationship between lengthening the task by different degrees may improve individual level estimation. Ultimately, novel empirical studies would be needed to quantify this, given that task lengthening is often less effective in practice due to increased participant fatigue. Other forms of improvement to the task itself are likely necessary. From a behavioral perspective, it appears that there is a need to enhance stimulus control over behavior within the task in order to improve signal-to-noise ratio of the data it produces.

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1. As a robustness test, analyses comparing confidence intervals calculated from the Standard Error of Measurement to those calculated via bootstrapping are reported in the supplementary materials (see Figures S7 and S8). Results of both approaches are very similar and lead to identical conclusions. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)